What a great conversation this is turning out to be! In the comments on the last post in this series, Bob mentioned the following (and managed to identify a response to the question at the heart of these posts). He says:
What Christian anti-foundationalism warns of is this: We should be wary of building our faith on the foundation of rationalism. While we can accept that we all generally think in a foundationalist fashion (basing what we believe on “basic” beliefs), we must reject the Cartesian Foundationalism of modernity that says that we can arrive at indubitable beliefs by way of Reason. Reason is not a god to whom we should be bending our knees. To get beyond the Cartesian Foundationalism of “Reason,” a Christian community openly embraces that we indeed have a “foundation” for all we believe and all we do — our experience with the incarnational, living God in our midst.
This comment has me thinking. I wonder if what we need is not "anti-foundationalism" but a kind of foundationalism that embraces more than indubitable certainty via reason. Most contemporary epistemology–even that of the foundationalist stripe, as exemplified by Audi and McGrew–rejects the Cartesian formula, which holds the following positions: 1) Foundational beliefs are (per Aristotle) axiomatic, whereby the objects of foundational beliefs are indubitable or clearly self-evident propositions; 2) the method of inference (or transmission) is deductive; 3) foundational beliefs are governed by a so-called second-order requirement—for any foundational knowledge, one can know that one can know (cf. Chisholm and is requirement that “we know pretty well what we think we know”).
I think McGrew's full proposal for strong foundationalism might serve as a viable alternative to Cartesian epistemological requirements. Just a note here that the page numbers that follow refer to Tim McGrew's essay, "A Defense of Classical Foundationalism," in Louis Pojman's Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings 3/e (Thomson Wadsworth, 2003). I want to highlight here something I posted earlier in our debate:
McGrew wants to return to strong foundationalism, but hesitates to return to the classical mode (a la Descartes) of understanding justification. He says, “there are compelling reasons to believe that our everyday empirical beliefs rest on a foundation of certainties” (McGrew, 195; emphasis mine). Instead of relying on axiomatic propositions or beliefs (e.g., mathematical and logical truths) as the only source of basic beliefs, McGrew wants to include empirical beliefs as well. The epistemic principle he comes to rely on is reference. Using the natural-language expression, “I am experiencing this,” he states that a “belief formed in this way cannot go wrong for a very simple reason: if there were nothing for the term this to refer to, it would not be possible to form the belief at all” (McGrew, 199). McGrew also adopts a type of Chisholmian position, stating that there must be at least one cognitively significant judgment for the process of justification and growth of knowledge to take place (see pp. 199-200).
A little more here on reference: Referentially formed beliefs arise in order to determine if we can have empirical beliefs with the same level of certainty that attends logical and mathematical truths. McGrew requires that strong foundationalism of the sort he is developing requires a property of incorrigibility—the idea that “for my belief in some contingent proposition to be incorrigible entails that, necessarily, if I believe that p, then p is true” (McGrew, 199). Reference is the way in which beliefs come to be incorrigible. Using the natural-language expression, “I am experiencing this,” he states that a “belief formed in this way cannot go wrong for a very simple reason: if there were nothing for the term this to refer to, it would not be possible to form the belief at all” (McGrew, 199). Basic beliefs/foundational beliefs must also be immune to being unjustified. He says, “the truth of a proposition must not be guaranteed by our act of believing but also bound up in the proper way with our mode of access to the subject matter of these propositions. But from an internalist point of view, these constraints are satisfied by referentially formed beliefs. The relevant content is something that lies within the individual’s field of awareness, and the very existence of that content is what makes the belief true” (McGrew, 199).
What we have here is a possible "in" for our experience. However, is it equivocating to say that experience may be accounted for through empirical beliefs and referentially-formed beliefs? McGrew's proposal introduces a bridge between reason and observation (or experience) lacking in the earlier Cartesian formulation.
Further questions for our probing are as follows: (a) is McGrew's proposal a workable one for spiritual formation? (b) why the jump to "anti-foundationalism," if (and certainly this is the position I have heard from many people dissatisfied with foundationalism) Descartes' version is outmoded? (c) what is the place for reason in the life of faith? That last question is kind of a bomb. I wrote a whole comprehensive examination question on that. Food for thought, and more to come (including more discussion about the consequences of whatever epistemological position established here has for spiritual formation…that was the point, wasn't it?
I wish I was trained and knowledgeable in what you’re referring to.
By faith we know. It is not anti-rational. But it is from a relational vantage point, between one’s self and God, one’s self and other selves, and one’s self and one’s world.
Of course this faith is also with reference to God’s revelation to us. And that revelation has to do with the reality and activity of the Trinity.
I find the emphasis on reason and logic I hear/read from some, as failing to see ourselves in our entirety as humans. We’re not just thinkers, as important as that is. We’re made for relationships, and we’re more than just epistemologues.
Just my little thought for the moment. But I’ll be interested in your further dialogue with Bob and those more knowledgeable than myself. A good education for me, and interesting.
Becky – great post and questions!
(Ted – you bring up a good point – “by faith we know.” And yes there is a rational component. Do I have faith if I just say I follow Jesus? Or do I need to have some type of understanding of God’s holiness, my sin and my need for redemption? )
For the Christian, knowledge of God requires a regenerate heart and includes the work of the Holy Spirit. Interestingly, I just read an essay today that debunks some of the caricatures of the last 150 years of Christian thought. I know of no Christian (and if there are some please point them my way to I can read what they say – I’m a newbie in this dialogue) who sees the cognitive part of knowing God as distinct and separate from other aspects of our being.
Perhaps those who perceive too great an emphasis on the intellect are committing a similar error by placing too great an emphasis on relational and the affective. I’m an electrical engineer by trade and there is an effective way to control any type of process in a plant – it’s called PID control. The concept is that you learn how the system behaves and you make small adjustments and tweak the parameters to keep the plant humming at it’s optimal condition. What I am observing in this foundationalist debate (not here but in some writings) is slamming the pendulum from one extreme to the other. The anti-foundationalist brings up important critiques of the previous system and yes one must be cognizant of all cultures when defining a system.
That is why I am excited about what Becky is doing here. If Cartesian foundationalism is mostly out with regards to Christian philosophy (and Becky would definitely be more privy to this than I am) then it should not be propped up as the straw man. I do not yet see a foundation at all in anti-foundationalism (isn’t that what the name implies). Experience of Christ is way too subjective…I’m feeling the sand between my toes. God could have supernaturally revealed himself to everyone throughout history – every believer could have been called through a Damascus road experience. But God chose to include the written word as a foundational component of his work in his creation. Something has to serve as the objective measure of the experience – and that is God’s special revelation through Christ as documented in scripture.
So Becky, I’m wondering about other models of modest foundationalism, are there some that you have evaluated and rejected as inadequate for spiritual formation? I need to review at least one other (I’ll try to decipher Moreland tonight) so I have a better understanding of McGrew’s unique insight. Also how might one classify the philosophy of Paul and the other apostles? So with regards to your 3 questions a) I’d be curious to hear a clear definition of spiritual formation since not all aspects are highly experiential, b) you have my opinion above c) one has to first define reason, is it just intellectual or also moral and affective. Personally I think the role it plays varies among individuals, but it must play some minimal role for everyone.
Nancy, Good stuff, and good point. Intersting as you grapple for a modest foundationalism, and maybe when it’s all said and done, I end up in the same camp.
I do believe that the underlying reality is the Trinity. And an important aspect of this reality for humans is rationality. Which is built in us as image bearers of God, as well as part and parcel of the revelation from God to us.
I want to read on this. But the anti-foundationalist is a response to making all depend on reason.
God’s revelation to us is not apart from reason. In fact reason plays a major role in it, maybe, in a sense, the major role. But God’s revelation comes to us in a way that comprehends and really blesses us in our entirety. And yes, to the child says, Simply have faith in me, and follow. Though you don’t understand. As you do, you will come to understand. But your walk with me will ever be one of faith, even when you don’t know.
Reason and the cognitive are always a part of what’s going on, as I see it, but never the whole part.
Ted: epistemologues! I love it!
Excellent questions raised here, and I'm especially intrigued by dealing with Paul's philosophy. I think there are telling passages of what I'll call (for the moment) philosophical wholism in Romans 12 and Colossians 2. Further, Jesus's imperatives to us demand the orientation of the whole self to loving God and neighbor.
If I understand what has transpired on the blog lately, the source of the critique against foundationalism is its tendency to go with reason and the mind and incorporate nothing else in order to understand faith.
If we go on the thesis (the very vague thesis) of philosophical wholism, then tendencies of reason, emotion, and experience function as a unity. As we are gifted, perhaps, some of us lead with different of these functions. My tendency is to "lead" with reason, but not at the expense of the other functions. Perhaps this mirrors the idea that Ted has introduced about the Trinity, although I'm keen to understand precisely what you mean by this, Ted.
Becky,
While I know only enough about philosophy to be foolish, like Nancy, my engineering experience gives me a practical view of truth (it works as expected) and falsity (it fails). But engineers work to make the the plan become truth—as Nancy suggested. And, I’ve thought quite a lot about Christian faith for a long time. So here’s my two cents.
I’m happy to see this discussion because what I know about foundationalism just doesn’t fit the reality that I’ve lived. For example, few people—including CEOs—come to conclusions through reason alone. More typically, they chose what they want to, and then use reason to justify it. In fact, the scientific method is not infrequently used this way: my thesis is what I want to conclude, I gather supporting evidence, then I write a rational argument to support my original thesis (belief). So much for inquiry. In final analysis, reason is just one tool out of several. Therefore, epistemology based upon, and assuming reason is partially descriptive at best.
But “belief” used to be have the same meaning as “faith.” Faith, comes from the French version (feid) of the Latin “fides” or trust. Belief and faith were used interchangeably during the period of the original English Bible translations (WC Smith, “Faith and Belief: The Difference Between Them”). Later, as the Enlightenment changed our ways of thinking such that “truth” became equivalent to “factual,” “belief” then morphed into something akin to accepting as true, that which is non-verifiable—believing the unbelievable. This change in meaning probably has had a considerably damaging effect on Christian faith.
Now I’m going to embarrass myself by delving into another area in which I have no expertise.
Christians are called not to “believe” in God and Christ, as we currently use the word “believe.” Instead, we are called to “trust in” God. Accepting that God exists is not necessarily required for faith and trust. In fact, I contend that belief (accepting as true) in the existence and trustworthiness of God and his promises grows as we put our trust in them and experience their trustworthiness. So, there is a symbiotic relationship between hope and fulfilled hope. We “believe” because we want to. Then we continue or discontinue believing according to the results. I want to believe that good triumphs over evil, and so I do. I put my trust in this principle and order my life accordingly. However, if in my experience evil triumphs over good more than the other way around, my faith, or belief, will fade.
Still, I see Christian faith (the teachings of Christ) as self fulfilling. If we all “believe,” then the reality will fit our belief. The mountain will be thrown into the sea, etc. Therefore, faith builds upon itself and fulfills itself. The kingdom of God is now, and will become. It is what we “believe,” and it results from that “belief.” The faith of a mustard seed is all that’s required to get the ball rolling.
So, epistemology seems too one-sided to me. We humans have the power to make true what we want to be true. Belief and knowing are not done deals. They are living systems. Barry Allen (“Knowledge and Civilization”) defines knowledge as human artifacts. Knowledge is civilization. But we also use knowledge to infer or create new knowledge. And so it is with faith. We start with faith-as-hope, and we build upon that mustard seed by living according to the world we want to be. By believing and doing, we bring into existence that kingdom in which we place our hope or faith. Consider that the name God gave to Moses at the burning bush is something like: “I am who I will become” or “I am who I will show you.” While God is, we can only know God by a faith that starts off as hope, grows by living according to that hope, and matures as our hope is rewarded.
However, a faith that says: “God said it, I believe it, and that’s that,” is not a growing faith. It stops at the initial hope stage but is stunted by dogmatic blinders that refuse to take risks that allow that initial seed to germinate and grow.
Does this make any sense?
Spiritual formation is dependent on the reality of the triune God. This dynamic is relational in nature. Not just reason oriented. We’re transformed by the renewing of our minds (Rom 12), so reason is important. But it is not foundational. God’s working as Trinity- past, always present, and future, is foundational. And our relationship to that and to him.
Not some postulate from a philosopher. Though there may very well be truth in that postulate. And certainly reason and logic is not to be thrown out the window, since this is a part of the image of God in us as humans.
Where’s Bob, to carry on a better conversation than myself with you, Becky- on the side of a kind of anti-foudnationalism?
Becky – what is spiritual formation?
All: thanks for your comments.
Ted, I appreciate your articulation of Trinity here. I’ve been wondering how that idea functions in your writing, and what you’ve provided is helpful.
bill: you’ve raised some provocative ideas re: truth. I’d like to think through those some more here or in another post. I have so many ideas right now that I can’t keep myself straight. A blessing, I guess.
Thanks all for insight in this matter.
Hey, this post and the comments have been a fun read!
In a comment above, Becky says, “the source of the critique against foundationalism is its tendency to go with reason and the mind and incorporate nothing else in order to understand faith.” I think that’s right. If we place reason as the foundation of what we can know, we had better take a clse look at what is really soveriegn in our lives! I think that there is something outside of our ability to objectively reason our way to “truth,” and that something is God’s revelation of himself to us. The Trinity wants to be known, and therefore, this is not some objective scientific enterprise. It is a dyanamic of subject interacting with subject. Spiritual Formation occurs when we authentically interact with the living God.
Bob – I like your definition that “spiritual formation occurs when we authentically interact with the living God.” (although I’m a little burned out on the word authentic – I wonder if there is something better). You also state what knowledge of God is by stating what it is not – some objective scientific enterprise. – Thanks
Bob:
Glad you’ve been enjoying this business. I’ve learned a lot in the comments and reflections.
I think McGrew’s foundationalist proposal succeeds because it stands in the gap between the rationalist-empiricist debate that is left to us by modern philosophy. Kant’s solution to this problem is not satisfactory either, because it flips the categories and understanding of knowledge into a wholly subjective process. McGrew’s foundationalist proposal manages to integrate more than “mere reason” at the most fundamental stages of our epistemology.
Bob, you bring up an interesting and curious point when you say that God’s revelation is “outside of our ability to objectively reason our way to ‘truth’.” I’m interested in what you mean by this. Are you referring to special revelation in Christ, general revelation, or something “in between?”
Another, more general inquiry, is the place (if any) natural theology and understanding of creation/conscience has in the current Christian millieu.
The problematic and wonderful thing about blogs is the opportunity to exegete comments. If you find it tedious, please let me know. I like the organic way of learning, though, that comes out of these types of exchanges.
Becky,
As I understand it, one of the postmodern critiques of modernist philosophy (you being a philosopher, maybe you can clear this up for me if I have it wrong) is that it has an overconfidence in objectively arriving at truth.
Postmoderns, however, can swing the pendulum to the point of saying that since we cannot arrive at “objective truth” then we can never know that there is a God and we can never trust a faith community’s conception of that God.
I propose a middle ground: That, no, we cannot arrive at truth through scientific objectivity, but God is not an object to be studied. He is a subject that, in fact, seeks to be known. He does this through many different means: special revelation (the Bible), general revelation (as you state), and through the communitarian narratives and practices of the faith communities that know Him.
Yikes, Bob! I read this post before bed last night and I had trouble sleeping. I smell a whole other post coming out of this business. Thanks!
Becky & all,
Well, the things you find when you’re not expecting ‘em … !
It’s very flattering to see my position being discussed so vigorously. Here are just a few stray comments to stir the pot a bit.
Foundationalism is not a theory of how we do (or how we ought to) arrive at conclusions. Rather, it’s a theory about the relations in which our beliefs must stand — to each other, to experience, and to fundamental truths of reason — if they are to be epistemically justified. I think this point may alleviate Bob’s worry that foundationalists are committed to an unrealistic picture of our cognitive activity.
That being said, don’t epistemologists care about how we come to our beliefs? Sure. But the issues there are different and have their own subtleties. Suppose that, given what you believed yesterday, you (rightly) believed that if P were true, Q would be highly probable. Today, you learn that P. Should you (today) ascribe a high probability to Q? Don’t answer too fast! (The right answer seems to be, “Yes, under certain conditions that aren’t always met.”)
Tim,
How much re-examination of what we believed yesterday is reasonable before we accept the probability of Q today? Clearly it it would make life Unmanageable were we to daily re-affirm all prior beliefs, but surely there are some circumstances where particulars change from day to day which may affect warranted beliefs. For instance, if yesterday I believed that if Mr. Jones is not married, there is a high probablility I will be asked to dinner. Today I find Mr. Jones is not married. I also find he is engaged…
The passage of time and the entry of new information bears on our conclusions day to day, does it not?
Susan,
Absolutely. One of the goals of epistemology is to try to outline the conditions under which it’s reasonable for us to change our minds.
It’s important to remember that nobody (sane) thinks that we have to rehearse all of our beliefs in order for them to be our beliefs. We believe many things tacitly. I believe (and so do you) that there are more than 32,771 people living in New York City. But until I wrote than line and until you read it, neither of us had ever thought of it quite that way before. Such tacit beliefs play a genuine role in our cognition. It is neither necessary nor feasible for us to rehearse them (or our reasons for them) in order for them to play an appropriate role in our thinking. But I do think it important that if we wondered whether the belief that P is reasonable on the basis of our present evidence we could, given time and reflective resources, determine whether it is.
Foundationalism is a theory of cognitive “snapshots,” and the snapshot will typically change as time passes. We gain and lose access to pieces of information all the time. This afternoon, for example, my back aches. A year from now, I may dimly recall that I had written something on a blog about having been in pain, but I will infer that I was in pain from my memory at that point, whereas now I am not inferring it from anything else: I’m aware of the pain directly. This illustrates how the passage of time and the loss of information bears on our conclusions day to day. And of course the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the entry of new information.
[...] So by the time I got to Becky V.’s for what is quickly becoming the highlight of this Summer: a bi-monthly meeting of feminine minds around the topics we care about most… I was pretty spent. [...]
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