In addition to discussing some initial ideas about spiritual formation, this post will focus on anti-foundationalism. The discussion about "foundationalism" and its centrality to faith, as well as its inadequacy as a philosophical construct seem to be the watchwords for discussion about the Church and contemporary models of discipleship. I will lay out the central idea, discuss two alternatives (strong foundationalism (via McGrew) and modest foundationalism (via Audi)), choose a side (the suspense is killing you), and discuss its consequences for spiritual formation.
About Spiritual Formation
Spiritual Formation is that process by which believers cultivate and change the orientation of his/her soul to be more like Christ. Professor Howard Baker likens spiritual formation to askesis, or the practice and training of the self in soul care before God (Acts 24:16, I Cor 9:24-27, I Tim 4:7, Luke 5:16). I'll use Paul's paradigm in Romans 12 also presents a set of guidelines for transforming life before God in community:
[1]Therefore, I urge you, brothers, in view of God's mercy, to offer your bodies as living sacrifices, holy and pleasing to God—this is your spiritual act of worship. [2]Do not conform any longer to the pattern of this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind. Then you will be able to test and approve what God's will is—his good, pleasing and perfect will.
[3]For by the grace given me I say to every one of you: Do not think of yourself more highly than you ought, but rather think of yourself with sober judgment, in accordance with the measure of faith God has given you. [4]Just as each of us has one body with many members, and these members do not all have the same function, [5]so in Christ we who are many form one body, and each member belongs to all the others. [6]We have different gifts, according to the grace given us. If a man's gift is prophesying, let him use it in proportion to his faith. [7]If it is serving, let him serve; if it is teaching, let him teach; [8]if it is encouraging, let him encourage; if it is contributing to the needs of others, let him give generously; if it is leadership, let him govern diligently; if it is showing mercy, let him do it cheerfully. (NIV)
I'll examine Paul's words here in more detail below.
Anti-Foundationalism
Anti-foundationalism is one of the chief claims of American philosophy, and (according to Bernstein) is a view adopted from pragmatism by postmodernism. Anti-foundationalism is first articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1868, and maintains against "the idea that knowledge rests upon fixed foundations, and that we possess a special faculty of insight or intution by which we can know these foundations" (Bernstein, in Pragmatism: A Reader, 385). On this operating idea, Peirce created a semiotic theory "where interpretants are always and necessarily open to further interpretation, determination, and critical correction" (385). So what anti-foundationalism is eschewing is the notion that there are fixed foundations and that we can know somehow these fixed foundations. Anti-foundationalism supports the idea that the objects (or, in Peirce's case) the signs of faith are always open to interpretation.
Richard Poirer, in his essay "Reading Pragmatically," says that the anti-foundationalism of the classical pragmatists (i.e., Peirce, James and Dewey) was marked by the distrust of language and lingusitic skepticism, "allied to pronounced theological and cultural skepticisms" (Poirer, in Pragmatism: A Reader, 438-9). So the classical pragmatists and their contemporary heirs share a mistrust of language meant to convey certain "intractable" ideas, linguistic, theological, cultural, or otherwise. This skepticism allows for the triumph of praxis over theory: ideas are continually tested, accepted, or rejected based on their efficacy for the individual doing the testing. Anti-foundationalism is the epistemological ground that allows for the pragmatist to say that truth is "whatever works."
I'd venture to guess that while anti-foundationalism is attractive for the practice of soul-care, because of its emphasis on praxis and subjectivity it doesn't fit a biblical paradigm of soul care and genuine transformation. Paul's words in Romans 12 are suggesting that there are fixed "measuring sticks" in v. 2: the pattern of this world and God's perfect will. Further, the employment of gifts discussed in vv 6-8 is presented "in accordance with" the measure of faith. To adopt anti-foundationalism is to understand that there are no measuring sticks, no measures of faith, and as a result no mooring for change or transformation in the light of Christ's redeeming work.
Alternatives
The kind of foundationalism Peirce is seeking to refute is that of the Cartesian sort, by which we come to know our foundations via the illumination of the "natural light." The problem proposed by the skeptic against foundationalism at any point, “amounts to doubt that the supposedly basic beliefs really are underwritten by a true epistemic principle” (McGrew, in Pojman's Theory of Knowledge, 197). The foundationalist must show that basic beliefs arise in a way that requires the believing subject to believe them. Cartesian foundationalism requires “Basic beliefs must be certainties, and the inference relations leading from those beliefs to higher-level beliefs must be deductively valid, allowing for no possibility of error at any step along the way” (McGrew, 195). In response to the skeptic, then, basic beliefs emerge via the natural light, or appear to the subject as “clear and distinct” ideas.
Robert Audi makes a distinction between the General Foundationalism of Descartes, and the Falibilist Foundationalism he is advocating. The General Foundational (GF) idea of justification is as follows: For any S and any t, the structure of S’s body of justified is at t foundational, and therefore any inferentially justified beliefs S has depend on non-inferentially justified beliefs of S’s. This view of foundationalism is descriptive with regard to justification. Cartesian–or general–foundationalism also has three main elements, according to Audi: 1) Foundational beliefs are (per Aristotle) axiomatic, whereby the objects of foundational beliefs are indubitable or clearly self-evident propositions; 2) the method of inference (or transmission) is deductive; 3) foundational beliefs are governed by a so-called second-order requirement—for any foundational knowledge, one can know that one can know (cf. Chisholm and is requirement that “we know pretty well what we think we know”).
Robert Audi wants to distinguish his Falibilist Foundationalist (FF) method of justification from the Cartesian Foundational method of justification. There are three characteristics of FF: 1) foundational beliefs may turn out to be unjustified, false, or both; 2) superstructure beliefs—those arising from our non-inferential beliefs—need only be justified inductively, rather than deductively (as GF requires); 3) the possibility for discovering error of the lack of justification for all beliefs, including foundational ones, is left open. Modest Contemporary/Falibilist Foundationalism equates “basic beliefs” with non-inferential beliefs, which include memory, consciousness, reflection and perception. The answer to the skeptical question regarding the emergence of basic beliefs is broadened with a weaker foundationalism than the strong, classical version.
Tim McGrew wants to return to strong foundationalism, but hesitates to return to the classical mode of understanding justification. He says, “there are compelling reasons to believe that our everyday empirical beliefs rest on a foundation of certainties” (McGrew, 195). Instead of relying on axiomatic propositions or beliefs (e.g., mathematical and logical truths) as the only source of basic beliefs, McGrew wants to include empirical beliefs as well. The epistemic principle he comes to rely on is reference. Using the natural-language expression, “I am experiencing this,” he states that a “belief formed in this way cannot go wrong for a very simple reason: if there were nothing for the term this to refer to, it would not be possible to form the belief at all” (McGrew, 199). McGrew also adopts a type of Chisholmian position, stating that there must be at least one cognitively significant judgment for the process of justification and growth of knowledge to take place (see pp. 199-200).
Consequences for Spiritual Formation
Based on these alternatives, I want to recommend that for the process of spiritual formation we adopt a position similar to Audi's modest foundationalism. In order to adequately transform ourselves and our lives to be more like Christ, we must recognize that those beliefs we develop chiefly from reflection and perception may turn out to be incorrect based on observation or other inductive processes. It could be that (a) I have believed something wrong about my own life in light of faith, and (b) have lived out according to this incorrect view. In light of new teachings or new influences I can change my beliefs to draw my life nearer to the standard of God's pleasing and perfect will.
This position also accomodates the falsifiability principle w/r/t the Christian faith: if evidence emerges that disproves the Christian faith, then I am obligated to believe according to the evidence (taking a strong Cliffordian position here). Until that foundation is falsified, though, I am justified in holding the tenets of Christian faith at the foundations of my being. I'm arguing here for a multi-level system of justification: I am justified by virtue of empirical evidence (e.g. McGrew's inclusion of empirical beliefs) in believing Christianity and its demands on my life are true, but my formation and position with respect to true Christianity is fallible based on my ability to grasp and change wrong belief or orientation (i.e., the process of spiritual formation).
Becky,
If I’m a foundationalist, then I agree with you in a modest form of it. We are so much people of our time and places. But Scripture does indicate a law from God within the human heart, as well as creation itself pointing to the Creator God. All of God’s general revelation. Which people suppress in unrighteousness.
Underlying all, is the Trinity. I think for anyone to acknowledge God in looking at a flower, etc., is a mercy of God. It is evident to all, only by God’s mercy, since we suppress the truth in our unrighteousness.
I would like to ask, where philosophically, did foundationalism begin? Scripture may support it, or may not. It is also a philosophical term.
Thanks for stretching us. I need to read more. I’m interested in the book that Myron Penner edited on foundationalism (can’t recall its name).
Hi Ted:
I’ll venture a guess on the historical question and say that foundationalism has its roots in Aristotle: there are certain foundations (axioms) of thought that are necessary and need not be demonstrated in themselves to serve as knowledge: the law of non-contradiction is one such axiom. While the law of non-contradiction is defended as necessary for existence, thought, and right conduct the law itself does not need to be developed: this would lead to a reductio ad absurdum. As I understand it, most recent attacks on foundationalism are directed at the “modern” version developed by Descartes. Recent versions though, as developed by Audi and McGrew, have brought foundationalism (with respect to justification of beliefs) more vigorously back into the conversation.
My familarity with foundationalism is chiefly through a philosophical lens. However, your indication of Paul’s words to the Romans (chs 1, 2) may present a scrptural notion of foundationalism as well. I need to think more on this, though. Thanks!